This paper estimates the effect of Disability Insurance receipt on labor supply. Exploiting the effectively random assignment of judges to disability insurance cases, we use instrumental variables to address the fact that those allowed benefits are a selected sample. We find that benefit receipt reduces labor force participation by 26 percentage points three years after a disability determination decision, although the reduction is smaller for those over age 55, college graduates, and those with mental illness. OLS estimates are similar to instrumental variables estimates. We also find that over 60% of those denied benefits by an Administrative Law Judge are subsequently allowed benefits within 10 years, showing that most applicants apply, re-apply, and appeal until they get benefits. * Comments welcome at jae.song@ssa.gov and efrench@frbchi.org. Affiliations are Social Security Administration and Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, respectively. French thanks the Social Security Administration for hospitality while much of this paper was written. We thank
Introduction
This paper presents new evidence on the effect of Disability Insurance (DI)/Supplemental Security Income (SSI) receipt on labor supply. We compare the earnings patterns of individuals who applied for and received disability insurance benefits to the earnings patterns of those who applied for benefits but were denied.
Relative to Bound's (1989) classic study on earnings of rejected DI applicants, we make the following key improvement. We address the fact that those who are denied benefits are potentially different than those who are allowed. Using Social Security administrative data, we exploit the assignment of DI cases to Administrative Law Judges (ALJs), an assignment which is essentially random. We document large differences in allowance rates across judges, and show that these differences are unrelated to the health or earnings potential of DI applicants. Using instrumental variables procedures, we use judge specific allowance rates to predict allowance of individual cases. We then use predicted allowance to estimate the effect of allowance on labor supply.
We find that three years after assignment to an ALJ, DI benefit allowance reduces earnings $4,059 per year and labor force participation 26 percentage points. As it turns out, our estimates are not very sensitive to accounting for the fact that those who are denied benefits are potentially different than those who are allowed: instrumental variables estimates are very close to OLS estimates for those assigned to an ALJ. These estimates imply a high labor supply elasticity with respect to the after-tax wage. The earnings and participation elasticities are 1.8 and 1.5, respectively.
However, many initially-denied DI applicants appeal or re-apply. In fact, we find that 40% of applicants who are denied benefits by an ALJ are eventually allowed benefits within three years. Furthermore, 40% of those not allowed benefits three years after an assignment to an ALJ are allowed benefits within 10 years of assignment. In order to be allowed benefits, the applicant cannot earn above a small amount. As a result, few applicants work during the appeal process, even though they are currently not receiving benefits. This has an important impact on our estimated effects. When we measure earnings and DI benefit allowance five years after assignment to an ALJ, rather than three, we find that DI allowance reduces earnings $4,915 per year, rather than $4,059.
Furthermore, we estimate labor supply responses for different subgroups of the population.
We identify many subgroups of the population whose labor supply is not sensitive to benefit receipt, such as those over age 55, college graduates, and those with mental illness. Because we have the population of DI applicants whose case was heard by a judge, we obtain precise estimates of the labor supply responses, even for these narrow subgroups of the population.
Using a Marginal Treatment Effects approach, we find that marginal applicants handled by stricter judges (who allow benefits to relatively few applicants) have slightly smaller labor supply responses than the marginal applicants heard by lenient judges. This is consistent with the view that the marginal applicant handled by a strict judge is slightly less able to work than the marginal case handled by a more lenient judge. The marginal case heard by a stricter judge is, however, slightly more likely to get benefits in the future. This suggests that these strict judges delay benefit receipt rather than deny benefit receipt.
Section 2 gives a literature review, section 3 describes the DI system, section 4 describes our estimation methods, section 5 shows data, section 6 reports basic estimates, and section 7 concludes.
Literature Review
Disability Insurance is one of America's largest social insurance programs. In 2005, 4.1% of men ages 25-64 were receiving DI benefits (Autor and Duggan 2006) . Furthermore, many disabled individuals with low income receive Supplemental Security Income benefits. Most DI and SSI beneficiaries also receive health insurance benefits through Medicare (for DI beneficiaries) or Medicaid (for SSI beneficiaries). The combined cost of these programs was $428 billion in 2008 (Livermore et al. 2011) , making these programs several times more expensive than unemployment insurance. These rapidly rising costs have generated many policy proposals to reform the system (Autor and Duggan 2010, Burkhauser and Daly 2011).
DI is often cited as a major cause of the fall in labor supply of American men aged 55-64.
In order to better understand the labor supply effects of DI, Bound (1989) compared earnings patterns of individuals who applied for and received DI benefits to those who applied for benefits but were denied. He found that those who were allowed benefits were less likely to work than those who were denied, but the effect was modest. Even those who were denied benefits had participation rates of less than 50% after denial of benefits. The difference in participation rates of those allowed versus denied was 34 percentage points. Thus, Bound in-ferred that at most 50% of rejected male applicants during the 1970s would have worked were it not for the availability of disability benefits. These estimates imply that DI is responsible for well under half of the fall in labor supply of American men aged 55-64 over the 1970s and Parsons (1991) and Bound (1989 Bound ( , 1991 ) discuss three key criticisms of Bound's approach.
First, those who are denied benefits are different than those who are allowed. Differences in labor supply between those denied and allowed are partly due to the effect of DI, but also partly due to the two groups having different propensities to work, even when receiving the same DI treatment. People whose applications were denied are likely to be in better health, which, all else equal, should make them more likely to work, which is what Bound (1989) argued. However, those who are denied benefits also tend to have very intermittent work histories (Lahiri et al. 2008) , suggesting that their non-health characteristics make them less likely to work. For this reason, OLS might be biased up or down. As a result, it is not clear whether those who are denied are more or less likely to work in the absence of benefits and whether OLS overstates or understates the work disincentive effects of DI.
It is this problem that our study addresses. Our identification approach compares those who are denied benefits to those who are otherwise similar but are allowed benefits. Our approach complements the approach of Chen and Van der Klaauw (2008) who exploit the vocational grid. They use the fact that in many cases, an individual aged 54 applying for benefits would be denied, although the same individual at age 55 would be allowed. Our estimated labor supply effects are similar to Chen and Van der Klaauw (2008) . However, we add to their analysis by providing larger sample sizes. This allows for more precise estimates. It also allows us to document how the responsiveness of labor supply varies with demographics, because we can obtain precise estimates for narrow subgroups.
Our estimated effects are also similar to Maestas et al. (2011) , who use assignment of disability examiners at the initial stage of the DI application process as a source of variation in allowance rates. This paper makes three contributions relative to that paper. The first is that judges are assigned to cases on a rotational basis, which makes the assignment process random for all practical purposes, whereas examiners at the initial stage may specialize. Thus our source of variation is more clearly exogenous. Second, we obtain more precise estimates, allowing us to document how the responsiveness of labor supply varies with demographics.
Third, our data includes earnings and the share of individuals who are allowed or are appealing up to 10 years after the ALJ allowance decision, whereas they have data only on earnings and the share working, and only up to three years after an initial allowance decision. This is important because we find that 40% of those not allowed benefits three years after an assignment to an ALJ are allowed benefits within 10 years of assignment.
Our paper, Van der Klaauw (2008) and Maestas et al. (2011) all obtain identification at different stages of the adjudication process, and thus our estimated effects correspond to different pools of applicants. Thus the three studies are of independent interest. For example, the disparities in allowance rates across ALJs has received a great deal of attention in policy circles (Social Security Advisory Board, 2006), legal studies (Taylor, 2007) , and the popular press (Paletta, 2011) . Despite the differences between our paper, Chen and Van der Klaauw The second criticism of Bound's approach is that many individuals who are denied continue to appeal the denial. In order to be deemed eligible for benefits, the individual cannot work while appealing the denial. Thus, many of those who are denied do not work in order to increase the chances of successful appeal. If the option to appeal had not existed, more of these individuals might have returned to the labor force. We partly address this problem by estimating the labor supply response to whether the individual was allowed benefits three years after assignment to a judge, although we show that many re-apply and appeal well after three years. We provide new evidence on the share of denied individuals who appeal and subsequently receive benefits. 1 Third, in order to apply for benefits, the individual must be out of the labor force for a period of time. For example, the individual can only work a very limited amount in the five months before applying for benefits. During that period, human capital may depreciate (Autor et al. (2012) ). Thus the individual may not be able to return to her previous job, even if she is healthy. In other words, the very act of applying for benefits reduces ability to work. Our study does not address this issue.
The Disability Insurance System
This section shows that that the DI application process is high stakes: DI benefits are worth about $200,000 to a typical beneficiary if they maintain low earnings. Those allowed benefits face strong work disincentives. Those denied benefits face strong incentives to reapply and appeal. Judges who make allowance decisions are for all practical purposes randomly assigned to cases. Judicial independence means that judges have a great deal of latitude to determine eligibility (Taylor, 2007) , and as a result judges can have very different allowance rates.
Labor Supply Incentives
Both income effects (through the high replacement rate) and substitution effects (beneficiaries will lose benefits if they earn above the SGA amount) indicate that DI should reduce labor supply. If an applicant is allowed DI benefits, the dollar amount of benefits depends on previous labor earnings. Disabled worker benefits averaged $1,004 per month among DI beneficiaries in 2007 (Social Security Administration, 2008) . Because the benefit schedule is progressive, disability benefits replace 60% and 40% of labor income for those at the 10th and 50th percentile of the earnings distribution, respectively (Autor and Duggan 2006) . Those receiving benefits can earn up to the Substantial Gainful Activity level (SGA), which was $500 per month (in current dollars) during the 1990s and $900 per month in 2007. Those earning more than this amount for more than a nine month Trial Work Period lose their benefits.
1 Understanding subsequent allowance and appeal is also an important input into dynamic models of DI application and receipt, such as Bound et al. Relatively few people lose disability benefits for reasons other than death. 2 For example, of 7.1 million individuals (DI worker beneficiaries) drawing DI benefits in 2007, 0.5% had benefits terminated because they earned above the SGA level for an extended period of time in 2007. Another 0.3% had benefits terminated because they were deemed medically able to work after a continuing disability review, which is a periodic review of the health of DI beneficiaries (Social Security Administration, 2007).
The disability allowance decision is high stakes. If the individual is allowed benefits, that individual is typically given disability benefits until the normal retirement age (age 65 during the 1990s and now 66), when these benefits are converted into Social Security benefits. Thus a 52 1 2 year old receiving $12,000 in annual disability benefits will likely receive these benefits for 12 1 2 years, meaning that she will receive $150,000 in transfers. Furthermore, two years after receiving benefits, she will receive Medicare benefits, which are worth at least $50,000.
Thus, being allowed benefits is worth on average $200,000 over a lifetime. The first condition is "listed impairment". Individuals that meet one of over 100 specific listed impairments are given immediate benefits. Examples include statutory blindness (i.e., corrected vision of 20/200 or worse in the better eye) and multiple sclerosis.
Determining Eligibility for DI benefits
The second condition is inability to perform either past work or other work. This condition involves a combination of medical impairment and vocational factors such as education, work experience, and age. These cases can be especially difficult to evaluate. Myers (1993), a former Social Security Administration Deputy Commissioner, points out that "if a worker has a disability so severe that he or she can do only sedentary work, then disability is presumed in the case where the person is aged 55 and older, has less than a high school education, and has worked only in unskilled jobs, but this is not so presumed in the case of a similar young worker. Clearly, borderline cases arise frequently and are difficult to adjudicate in an equitable manner!" The disability determination process is a multi-step process. Figure 1 shows the share of applicants who are allowed at different steps during our sample period (described in detail in Section 4 and Appendix A). After an initial waiting period of five months, DI applicants have their case reviewed by a Disability Determination Service review board. Figure 1 shows that 39% of applicants are allowed and 61% are denied at this stage. At this stage the most clear-cut cases are allowed, such as those with a listed impairment. Cases that are more difficult to judge (such as musculoskeletal problems) are usually denied at this stage. About half of all applicants denied for medical reasons appeal at the disability determination service reconsideration stage. About 10% of those that appeal are allowed benefits at this stage (Social Security Administration, 2008). Sixty days after the disability determination service decision, a DI appeal can be requested. DI appeals are reviewed in court by Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) after a delay of about one year. 3 14% of all initial claims, or 59% of all claims that are appealed, are allowed at the ALJ level. 4 If the case is denied at the ALJ level, the applicant can then appeal to the Appeals Council level. If the applicant is denied at this level, she can then appeal after 60 days at the Federal Court level. However, Figure 1 shows that appeals at the higher levels are rarely successful: less than 2% of all initial claimants receive benefits at the Appeals Council or Federal Court level. Lastly, denied applicants can end their appeal and re-apply for benefits. The last line on Figure 1 includes those who reapply for benefits. Another 7% of all initial claims are eventually allowed benefits through a re-application. 33% do not get benefits at any stage after 10 years. Figure A1 in the appendix shows that most who do not get benefits after a few years end their appeals. However, 10 years after initially claiming, 6% are still in the process of appealing or re-applying.
Because we identify the causal effect of DI on labor supply using variation at the ALJ level, the estimated effect applies only to marginal cases. The least healthy individuals, such as those with listed impairments, will almost always be allowed at the Disability Determination Service stage. The healthiest individuals will almost always be denied by every judge and on every appeal. Thus our results may not be fully generalizable to all DI applicants. However, these marginal cases are of great interest, because these are the individuals most likely to be affected by changes in the leniency of the appeals level of the DI system. 3 Judges can make one of three decisions: allowed, denied, or remand. A "remand" is a request for more information from the disability determination service. Our measure of "allowed" is the final determination at the ALJ stage, and thus includes the final decision on remands. 4 The full allowance rate at this stage is slightly higher than 59%. Our 59% allowance rate is for our estimation sample, which drops pre-reviewed cases that have higher allowance rates. See footnote 7.
Assignment of DI cases to judges
Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) are assigned to appeals cases on a rotational basis, with the oldest cases receiving priority at each hearing office. 5 Thus, the oldest case is given to the judge who most recently finished a case. Therefore, conditional on applying at a given office at a given point in time, the initial assignment of cases to judges is "essentially random" (Social Security Advisory Board, 2006). Judges do not get to pick the cases they handle.
Judges are not assigned cases based on the expertise of the judge. Furthermore, an individual cannot choose an alternate judge after being assigned a judge.
The initially assigned judge is not necessarily the judge who decides the case. Paletta (2011) documents a judge who took assigned cases from other judges and made decisions on those cases. Thus the cases were not randomly assigned to the deciding judge. 6 Fortunately, however, we have information on the assigned judge in addition to the deciding judge. Although the deciding judge is not necessarily randomly assigned, the initially assigned judge is. We use the initial assignment to a judge as our source of exogenous variation. As it turns out, the initially assigned judge is the same as the deciding judge in 96% of all cases.
The assigned judge is for all practical purposes randomly assigned conditional on hearing office and day. However, individuals are not randomly assigned to hearing offices. The zip code in which a person lives determines the hearing office to which they are assigned. The characteristics of applicants vary by location (e.g., black lung disease is more common near mining towns) as well as across time (e.g., the share of DI applicants listing mental illness as the main health problem has risen over time). For this reason we condition explicitly on 5 Title 5, Part III, Subpart B, Chapter 31, Subchapter I, Section 3105 of the US Code states that "Administrative law judges shall be assigned to cases in rotation so far as practicable" (United States, 2007). The Social Security Administration's Hearings, Appeals and Litigation Law Manual (HALLEX) Volume I Chapter 2 Section 1-55 states that "the Hearing Office Chief Administrative Law Judge generally assigns cases to ALJs from the master docket on a rotational basis, with the earliest (i.e., oldest) Request for Hearing receiving priority." (Social Security Administration, 2009). HALLEX gives 11 exceptions to this rule. For example, the exceptions include "critical cases", such as individuals with terminal conditions and military service personnel, as well as remand cases. These cases are expedited and reviewed by Senior Attorneys. If there is a clear cut decision to be made, then the Senior Attorney will make the decision without a hearing. If the case is not clear cut, then the case is put back in the master docket and is assigned to a judge in rotation. Fortunately we can identify cases that were decided without a hearing and we delete them from our sample. Our analysis focuses on the remaining cases where there was a hearing.
hearing office and day in the estimations below. In doing so, we exploit only within hearing office-day variation in judge level leniency.
Estimating Equations
In order to estimate the effect of DI allowance on earnings and labor force participation, we use a two-step procedure. In the first step we generate an instrumental variable that is a measure of judge leniency. Conditional on the hearing office and time, this variable is correlated with the probability of allowance, but is independent of health, ability, or preferences for work. In the second step we use instrumental variables procedures to estimate the effect of DI on earnings, participation, appeals, and subsequent allowance.
Basic Specification
Our basic estimating approach is a modified instrumental variables regression where in a first stage we estimate
where A it is a 0-1 indicator equal to 1 if individual i is allowed benefits at time t, j i is a full set of judge indicator variables equal to 1 if judge j heard individual i's case, and X i is a full set of hearing office-day indicators (equal 1 if individual i's case is assigned to that hearing office-day pair). The allowance rate and estimated parameters depend on time since many individuals initially denied benefits are subsequently allowed.
For the second stage we adopt the random coefficients model of Bjorklund and Moffitt (1987) :
where y iτ is either earnings, participation, appeals or allowance at time τ . We allow for time τ ≥ t so that we can observe the effect of time t allowance on time τ outcomes. We allow for heterogeneity in the parameter φ iτ to capture heterogeneity in the effect of benefit receipt on earnings, appeals, and allowance, both across individuals and over time. We allow the variables u iτ and φ iτ to be potentially correlated with A it , and with each other. 7 Ideally we would be able to identify the entire distribution of φ iτ , although this is not possible. Below we describe what is identified given our data.
Estimating Equations
When estimating equation (2) we are confronted with three concerns. First, we wish to allow for heterogeneity in the parameter φ iτ . Second, we have 1,497 judges in our sample, each of whom is a potential instrument. IV estimators can suffer from small sample bias when both the number of instruments and the number of observations is large (e.g., Hausman et al. (2009)). Third, we have over 200,000 hearing office-day interactions in the covariate set
In order to address these three concerns, our estimation procedure is as follows. First, we de-mean variables by hearing office and day, and construct variables A it = A it −Ā it , y iτ = y iτ −ȳ iτ whereĀ it andȳ iτ are the mean values of A it , y iτ conditional on the hearing office and on the day that case i was assigned. Second, for every observation i in our sample, we estimate equation (1) in where A i1 (the ALJ decision) is the dependent variable. We leave out observation i, as in a jackknife estimator and calculate the mean of the difference between each of judge j i 's allowance decisions and the average allowance rate of all cases heard at the same hearing office and day. We define the estimated value of γ 1 from this procedure asγ 1,−i . The instrumental variable is j iγ1,−i , which we refer to as the judge allowance differential. Because we remove observation i, the estimated parameterγ 1,−i is independent of e it or u iτ , even in a small sample. Third, we estimate the equations
jointly using two stage least squares.
Given the above assumptions, Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006) and French and Taber (2011) point out that this procedure identifies a weighted average of φ iτ for the set of indi- 7 The residual uiτ is potentially correlated with Ait because those allowed benefits potentially have low earnings potential. Furthermore, φiτ is potentially correlated with Ait because more disabled people are unlikely to work, even when they get the benefit. Finally, uiτ and φiτ are potentially correlated with each other since unhealthy individuals have lower earnings, whether or not they are allowed benefits. viduals affected by the instrument if three conditions are met. First, if judges are randomly assigned to cases, conditional on date and hearing office, then assignment satisfies the "independence assumption". Second, if judges differ only in leniency, then Imbens and Angrist's (1994) "monotonicity assumption" is satisfied. The monotonicity assumption implies that a case allowed by a strict judge will always be allowed by a lenient one. Third, we assume that the instrument causes variation in allowance rates, sometimes known as the rank or existence condition. Sections 6.1 and 6.2 provide evidence on the extent to which the independence, monotonicity, and rank assumptions hold. 8 
Marginal Treatment Effects
Section 6.6 presents estimated Marginal Treatment Effects (MTEs), which is the participation or earnings response for the individuals whose allowance decision is affected by changing the instrument. We estimate the equations
where A it is the predicted value of A it from equation (6) , and the ∼ above the functions f (.) and K(.) means that they are also de-meaned. As shown by Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006) and French and Taber (2010), as well as appendix B, the MTE is
8 More formally, we are assuming that allowance follows
where Zi = (ji, Xi). The residual Vi can be thought of as the lack of severity of disability observed by the judge (but not by the econometrician). Equation (5) implies that all judges observe the same signal of disability Vi but differ in the level of severity necessary to be allowed benefits gt(Zi). We assume Vi is independent of ji and Xi, sometimes called the independence assumption. The latent variable framework gives rise to the monotonicity assumption. The rank condition is that plim Ait = Pr(Ait = 1|Zi) is a non-trivial function of Zi. Equation (5) is not identified because a monotonic transformation of both g(.) and V delivers the same choice probabilities. As a normalization, we assume that Vi is distributed uniformly. Furthermore, as a functional form assumption we assume that g(.) is linear in ji and Xi so that we can estimate equation (5) using the regression function in equation (1) .
where a t is a particular realization of allowance. Equation (8) shows that the MTE is the mean value of φ iτ for those who would be allowed if the value if their assigned judge allowed slightly higher than a share a t of cases, and would be denied if assigned to a judge allowing slightly lower than a share a t of cases. This value of a t can also be interpreted as the (lack of)
judge-observed severity of the case. As a t increases, the instrument affects individuals with lower levels of severity. We estimateγ 1,−i from equation (1) as before, then estimate equations (6) and (7), allowing the functions f (.) and K(.) to be polynomials. Heckman et al. (2006) experiment with different approaches to estimating the MTE. They find that the polynomial approach works about as well as other procedures. Our Monte Carlo simulations suggest there is very little bias when using polynomials. Furthermore, the polynomial procedure is computationally feasible when allowing for large numbers of covariates, such as a full set of hearing office-day interactions. Appendix B provides more details on interpretation and estimation of the MTE.
Data
Our initial sample is the universe of individuals who appealed either a DI or SSI benefit denial, and were assigned to an ALJ during the years 1990-1999. Using Social Security
Numbers, we match together data from the SSA 831 file, the Office of Hearings and Appeals Case Control System (OHACCS), the Hearing Office Tracking System (HOTS), the Appeals Council Automated Processing System (ACAPS), the Litigation Overview Tracking System (LOTS), the Master Earnings file (MEF), and the Numerical Identification file (NU-MIDENT). These data are described in greater detail in the appendix. To the best of our knowledge, neither the OHACCS, HOTS, ACAPS, nor the LOTS datasets have been used for research purposes before. We match in earnings, reapplications and appeals data from 11 years prior to 10 years following assignment to a judge. Thus our earnings and appeals data run from 1979 to 2009.
We drop all observations heard by a judge who heard less than 50 cases during the sample period. We also drop cases with missing education information. The right panel plots the judge allowance rate de-meaned by hearing office and day; it is thus the histogram of our instrumental variable. Figure 2 shows that there is less variation in allowance rates after conditioning on hearing office and day; one standard deviation in the unconditional judge allowance rate is .153, whereas conditional on hearing office and day it is .0659 (when weighted by the number of cases handled by the judge). This means that being assigned to a judge one standard deviation more lenient than the average at her office increases the probability of allowance at the ALJ stage by 6.59 percentage points. Thus conditioning on hearing office and day removes a non-trivial share of variation in judge allowance rates, but much of the variation is within hearing office and day.
Results

Establishing the validity of the randomization
In previous sections we claimed that the assignment of cases to judges is random, conditional on hearing office and day. Random assignment implies that we cannot predict the judge using observable characteristics of the judge's caseload. Table 1 presents tests of this hypothesis.
First we consider which variables predict allowance. Column 1 of Table 1 presents estimates from a regression of an allowance indicator (de-meaned by hearing office and day) on the age, race, earnings histories, and health conditions of individuals in our estimation sample. Women, older individuals, whites, those with strong attachment to the labor market, high earners, those represented by a lawyer, and those who did not complete high school are more likely to be allowed benefits. Column 2 presents t − statistics (all standard errors throughout are clustered by judge). It shows that these differences are highly statistically significant. The R 2 shows that the covariates explain 3.9% of the variation in allowance rates.
Our instrumental variable is the judge allowance differential, j iγ1,−i , de-meaned by hearing office and day. Column 3 presents estimates from a regression of the judge allowance differential on covariates. Column 4 provides t − statistics. Of the 22 covariates, two have The R 2 shows that the covariates explain .02% of the variation in judge specific allowance rates. Thus there is little evidence against the hypothesis of random assignment. Random assignment satisfies the independence assumption described in section 4.1. The next section provides some evidence on whether the rank and monotonicity conditions hold.
Year assigned to judge
First Stage Estimates
Column 1 of table 2 shows the number of observations for different groups of DI cases heard by an ALJ. Column 2 shows the allowance rate at the ALJ stage for that group. Column 3 shows the allowance rate of the group three years after assignment to an ALJ. Columns 2 and 3 show that older individuals, high earners, and those represented by lawyers have relatively high allowance rates. 9 Nevertheless, differences in allowance rates across subgroups are small.
Column 4 shows the estimated first stage regression coefficientλ 3 on the judge allowance differential from equation (3). Column 5 shows the standard error and column 6 the tstatistic. Column 4 shows that the probability of allowance is increasing in the judge allowance differential and column 5 shows that the increase is highly statistically significant for all the subgroups we consider. The estimated value ofλ 3 for the full sample is .764, meaning that the probability that case i is allowed 3 years after assignment rises .764% for every 1% increase in the judge allowance differential (which measures the allowance rate on all cases other than case i). The main reasonλ 3 is less than 1 is because we use allowance by the ALJ as the measure of the judge allowance differential in table 1, whereas we use allowance three years after assignment as our key measure of allowance in table 2. Many cases denied by an ALJ are later allowed.
Column 4 shows that the estimated coefficientλ 3 is larger for younger individuals, those with lower labor force participation and earnings prior to appealing, those not represented by a lawyer, and those whose primary health problem is an injury. Abadie (2003) shows that the ratio of the group specific estimate ofλ 3 relative to full sample estimate ofλ 3 is informative for understanding the characteristics of those allowed by a small increase in the ALJ allowance rate. He shows that this ratio yields the relative likelihood that someone with a given characteristic is allowed given a small increase in the allowance rate. Thus, an increase in the allowance threshold of all judges would increase the allowance rate of those with low earnings and injuries more than for other groups, holding the applicant pool and the rest of the re-applications and appeals process constant.
An important implication of the monotonicity assumption described in section 4.1 is that the probability of allowance is non-decreasing in the judge allowance differential for all subgroups of the population. If the allowance rate was rising in the judge allowance differential for some subgroups of the population, but was declining for others, it would show that lenient judges were less likely to allow benefits than strict judges for some types of cases.
We do not observe this and thus cannot reject an important implication of the monotonicity assumption. Furthermore, estimates are highly significant, so the rank conditions hold. Table 1 ; they include race, sex, age and education groups, health (disability category), average earnings and participation prior to disability, representation by an attorney, and an indicator of concurrent SSDI application. *For de-meaned allowance, all variables are de-meaned from the hearing office-day average. Tables 4 and 5 show that these individuals are unlikely to work. Moreover, only 16.2% of those allowed benefits in our sample die within 10 years, whereas 12.6% of those denied benefits die within 10 years. However, as pointed out by Bound (1989 Bound ( , 1991 , Parsons (1991) , and more recent research, those allowed benefits have stronger attachment to the labor market prior to applying for benefits. It is possible that this attachment extends to after when they apply for benefits. Thus it is possible that those allowed benefits are more likely to work in the absence of benefit receipt. This would imply that OLS understates the work disincentive effect of DI. Consistent with this view, table 2 shows that those allowed benefits have higher earnings and participation prior to applying.
Second Stage: the Effect of Disability Recipiency on Labor Supply
Thus it is an empirical question whether OLS overstates or understates the effect of DI receipt on participation.
The bottom rows of The results in this section are robust to a number of other modifications to sample selection and functional form. We discuss these results in table A3 in the appendix. These robustness checks include: dropping people who die within 3 years after assignment, including people with missing education information, and conditioning on hearing office-years interactions rather than hearing office day interactions. Table 4 disaggregates the participation responses by demographics, earnings, and health conditions. Column 1 reports mean earnings for allowed individuals, column 2 for denied individuals, column 3 the difference, and column 4 the standard error. Column 5 reports the IV estimate of allowance on earnings and column 6 the standard error. Table 4 shows that the effect of DI allowance on participation is relatively small for college graduates and those with mental disorders, but is larger for high school graduates and those with musculoskeletal problems and injuries. Participation responses are larger in the late 1990s than the early 1990s and early 2000s (recall that participation is measured three years after assignment, so assignment in 1999 refers to participation in 2002), potentially giving evidence that the work disincentive from DI is larger when it is easier to get a job. For most groups, the OLS estimates are very close to the IV estimates. One interesting exception is those with neoplasms. OLS estimates suggest decline in participation of 30.2% in response to allowance, whereas IV suggests a decline of only 19.4%. The low responsiveness of labor supply of those with mental illness is particularly surprising. Mental health is more difficult to monitor than many other health conditions. As a result, some analysts believe that many who claim mental illness are those who are healthy and would have worked in the absence of benefit allowance (Bound and Burkhauser, 1999) . This turns out not to be the case. 
Represented by lawyer
IV
Dynamics of the Response
This section shows the dynamics of the response of both earnings and participation. IV estimates for those allowed versus denied are virtually identical prior to assignment.
Recall that the difference in participation between the two groups is that predicted by the instrument of the judge allowance differential. A difference of 0 prior to assignment is a reassuring result, as it shows that we are unable to predict labor supply prior to assignment using our instrument. This is an important testable implication of the independence assumption.
However, after assignment, earnings and participation of allowed individuals are lower.
The top right panel shows that three years after the time of assignment, the difference in earnings between the two groups is $2,314 (virtually identical to the OLS estimate) and remains very stable thereafter. Similarly, the bottom right panel shows that three years after assignment the difference in participation between the two groups is 14.8%, and does not change much thereafter. The standard errors are tiny and thus omitted. For example, the standard error on the effect of allowance on participation averages less than 1% when using either OLS or IV.
Note that the IV estimate of the effect of allowance on earnings 3 years after allowance is smaller in figure 3 ($2,314 ) than in table 3 ($4,059). The difference arises because figure   3 uses allowance by the ALJ, whereas table 3 uses allowance 3 years after assignment to the ALJ. Section 6.5 discusses the difference between allowance by an ALJ and allowance at any point in time. The left panel of figure 4 shows the share of denied (at the ALJ stage) individuals who are reapplying/appealing and allowed relative to when they are assigned to a judge. 12 It 12 We use data from ACAPS and LOTS to identify denied applicants who successfully appealed at either the Appeals Council or the Federal Court level. We use data from SSA 831 files, MBR (Master Beneficiary shows that 35% of all applicants denied by an ALJ were allowed benefits within three years.
Furthermore, many initially denied individuals continue to reapply or appeal for many years after their initial denial. Three years after assignment to an ALJ, 40% of all individuals denied benefits are still in the process of appealing or reapplying for benefits. Combined, fully 75% of those denied by an ALJ are either allowed or in the process of appealing 3 years after assignment to an ALJ.
The right panel of figure 4 presents the share of initially denied individuals who are allowed benefits or are still in the process of reapplying/appealing relative to when they are assigned to a judge, where the shares are instrumented using the judge allowance differential. To do this we estimate the effect of predicted ALJ allowance on allowance and appeals at future points in time, as well as the procedure in appendix to C to infer the effect of ALJ denial on future allowance. 13 Thus the left panel uses OLS and the right panel uses IV, where initial denial is instrumented using the judge allowance differential. Those affected by the instrument are likely the marginal cases who have a better chance of final allowance than others denied benefits. For this reason we might think that subsequent allowance rates of those initially denied would be higher when instrumented. In fact, this is the case, although the OLS estimates and the IV estimates are similar. For example, the right panel figure 4 shows that for those initially denied benefits, the IV estimate of allowance is 42% three years after assignment, versus 35% from the OLS estimates. Sections 6.4 and 6.5 show that most denied applicants do not work, but engage in reapplications and appeals until they get DI benefits. This has an important effect on our main estimated effects. Table 3 shows that DI benefit allowance reduces earnings $4,059 per year when measuring earnings and allowance three years after assignment to an ALJ. However, DI benefit allowance reduces earnings $4,915 per year when measuring earnings and allowance five years after assignment to an ALJ.
Record), and SSR (Supplemental Security Record) to identify denied applicants who reapplied for benefits and were allowed at either the DDS, Reconsideration, ALJ, Appeals, or Federal Court level stage. 13 Using the full sample, we regress de-meaned allowance on a set of wave dummies and predicted demeaned ALJ allowance × wave dummies (where allowance is predicted using the judge allowance differential). The estimated coefficient on allowance×wave measures increased probability of allowance at a given wave conditional on initial denial. Next, we regress de-meaned appeal on a set of wave dummies and predicted demeaned ALJ allowance interacted with wave dummies (where allowance is predicted using the judge allowance differential). The estimated coefficient on allowance×wave measures increased probability of allowance at a given wave conditional on initial denial. The right panel of figure 4 plots the coefficient on predicted allowance×wave for both the allowance and appeal equations. The left panel of figure 5 shows the earnings decline and the right panel shows the participation decline of the marginal case when allowed (i.e., the Marginal Treatment Effect). We use third order polynomials for both the instrument and the endogenous variable (de-meaned allowance) when estimating equations (6) and (7). Both Akaike's information criterion and the Bayesian information criterion reject quadratic and quartic specifications in favor of the cubic. Furthermore, results from the quartic specification are very similar to the cubic specification. Since polynomial smoothers have poor endpoint properties, we show estimated MTEs over the middle 90% of the distribution of the judge allowance differential. Based upon Monte
Carlo experiments, we found our procedure produced little bias over the middle 90% of the distribution. Figure 5 also shows bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.
On average, annual earnings and participation decline $4,300 and 26% in response to benefit allowance, similar to the main estimates reported in table 3. However, there is heterogeneity in the declines. The earnings decline is $3,451 for the marginal applicant heard by an ALJ who is stricter than 95% of all judges, whose decisions lead to allowance rates that are nine percentage points below the average three years after assignment. The earnings decline is $4,131 for the marginal applicant heard by an ALJ who is more lenient than 95% of all judges, whose decisions lead to allowance rates that are eight percentage points above the average three years after assignment. When judge specific allowance rates rise, the labor supply response of the marginal case also rises. This result is consistent with the notion that as allowance rates rise, more healthy individuals are allowed benefits. These healthier individuals are more likely to work when not receiving DI benefits and thus their labor supply response to DI receipt is greater. Nevertheless, the differences in the earnings response are not statistically significant and is modest in size. Figure 6 : Marginal applicant's allowance probability 10 years after assignment conditional on not allowed 3 years after assignment to an ALJ. Figure 6 shows how allowance three years after assignment to an ALJ affects allowance 10 years afterwards. It shows that 40% of those not allowed three years after assignment were allowed benefits 10 years after assignment. For marginal applicants assigned to lenient judges and are not allowed three years after assignment, the probability of allowance 10 years after assignment is .38. For those assigned to strict ones it is .42. Recall that marginal applicants assigned to lenient judges and not allowed benefits are healthier than those assigned to strict judges. Thus it is unsurprising that they are less likely to be allowed benefits in the future.
What is remarkable, however, is that conditional on being denied 3 years after assignment, 40% have been allowed benefits 10 years after assignment.
Elasticity of Labor Supply with Respect to the After-Tax Wage
In this section we present estimates of the effect of DI on the after-tax (and after DI benefit) wage, as well as the earnings and participation elasticity with respect to the aftertax wage. Table 6 shows participation and earnings elasticities with respect to the after-tax wage, which we calculate as follows:
where E[y i |A i = 0] is the average outcome variable (either mean earnings or participation) of denied individuals and E[y i |A i = 1] is the average outcome variable for allowed individuals.
is the average after-tax wage for denied individuals and E[w i |A i = 1] is the average after-tax wage for allowed individuals. The after-tax wage is defined as the income gain from wage earnings plus DI benefits (net of federal, state and payroll taxes) when working. Appendix B presents the details of how we estimate after-tax wages.
We first predict the distribution of pre-tax wages for everyone in the sample. The first row of table 6 shows that the average predicted pre-tax wage of workers in our sample is $11,047. Next, we use Social Security earnings histories, the year, and state of residence to calculate DI/SSI benefits for everyone in the sample. The second row shows that the average DI/SSI benefit is $9,023. The third row shows the DI/SSI benefit reduction resulting from high earnings. People who are allowed benefits will lose most of their benefits if they work.
The fourth column shows that the average Federal, State, and payroll tax paid by those working is $2,081. The fifth row is after-tax income, which is labor income plus the DI/SSI Table 3 Elasticity is an arc elasticity: see equation ( Table 6 shows that the implied earnings elasticity is 1.9
and participation elasticity is 1.5. While our estimates suggest that most DI/SSI applicants would not work even if denied benefits, labor supply is elastic for this group of individuals.
In order to infer a labor supply elasticity with respect to the after-tax wage from the labor supply response to DI allowance, we make two strong assumptions. First, we assume that individuals are only responding to current work incentives and not future incentives.
However, individuals must keep their earnings below the SGA level in order to appeal or reapply for benefits. Therefore, the low earnings level of denied applicants may be caused by the incentives to keep earnings low in order to appeal or to reapply for benefits. Thus we are overstating the percent difference in the present value of future after-tax wages and understating the labor supply elasticity. To better assess this issue, we measure the labor supply response to allowance five years after allowance. Figures 1 and 3 show that after five years most DI/SSI applicants have either received benefits or have given up on the application process. Five years after assignment to an ALJ, the participation elasticity is 1.6, slightly higher than the elasticity three years after assignment.
Second, we omit the value of health insurance benefits from both work and from DI/SSI 
Conclusion
This paper estimates the effect of Disability Insurance receipt on labor supply. Using instrumental variables procedures, we address the fact that those allowed benefits are a selected sample. We find that benefit receipt reduces labor force participation by 26 percentage points three years after a disability determination decision, although the reduction is smaller for those over age 55, college graduates, and those with mental illness. OLS estimates are similar to instrumental variables estimates. The participation elasticity with respect to the after-tax wage is 1.5. Over 60% of those denied benefits are allowed benefits within 10 years,
showing that most applicants apply, re-apply, and appeal until they get benefits.
Appendix A: Data Appendix
We use the universe of all DI appeals heard by ALJs, 1990 ALJs, -1999 . We use data from Lastly, we use the SSA NUMIDENT for information on date of death. The NUMIDENT file includes information from the Social Security Number application form such as name, date of birth and Social Security number. Once the individual dies, the date of death is placed on the file. We treat individuals who die as missing, although we found that this assumption does not affect our results.
For Figure 1 and A1 we use all cases filed 1989-1999. We include all primary disabilityauxiliary benefit claimants (i.e., child and spouse) are excluded. We make no other sample restrictions for these cases. For all other figures and tables, we begin with the universe of all cases adjudicated by an ALJ and make the following sample restrictions, described in Table   A1: 1. We drop all Medicare cases. These Medicare cases are typically disputes over whether Medicare will pay for certain medical treatments.
2. We drop all remand cases (cases sent to Appeals Council, then sent back to the hearing office). We drop these because this would lead to double counting of cases, as a remand is a case that was already heard by an ALJ.
3. We drop cases with a missing Social Security number. This leaves us with 3,525,787
cases for 1990-1999.
4. We drop all cases younger than 35 or older than 64.
5. We drop cases with missing judge or hearing office information.
6. We drop cases that were previewed prior to being assigned to a judge. These cases are extremely likely to be critical cases that are reviewed by a senior attorney.
7. We drop cases where the claim is against the earnings record of a spouse or parent.
8. We drop cases with missing education data. This leaves us with 1,779,825 cases. Education allowance 3 years after assignment to a judge on participation 3 years after assignment to a judge. It conditions on a full set of hearing office-day interactions, drops observations that are missing education information, and includes those who died in the 3 years after assignment (and uses allowance status at time of death for allowance and sets participation to 0 for these individuals). In this appendix, we re-estimate the model, making different assumptions in the specifications below.
In the second row we include the 123,911 individuals with missing education. When we do this the estimate for participation rises in magnitude from -0.256 to -0.257. The third row drops both those with missing education (as in the baseline case) as well as the 49,017 individuals who died within 3 years following assignment. When we do this the estimate for participation rises in magnitude to -0.260. The fourth row uses the baseline sample and conditions on a full set of hearing office-year interactions, rather than a full set of hearing office-day interactions. This leaves the point estimate unchanged; more precisely, it changes the estimate from -0.2561 to -0.2565. Figure A1 : Share of all DI/SSI applicants who are allowed benefits, are applying/appealing, and share who are denied, no longer re-applying or appealing Figure A1 uses the same data as in figure 1 shows the total share of initial claims allowed at any level. It also disaggregates those cases not allowed into those where the application process ended versus those who were re-applying or appealing a denial. 10 years after the initial filing, 67% of all claimants were allowed benefits, 27% were denied and the process ended, and 6% were still in the process of applying for benefits. Together, figures 1 and A1 emphasize the fact that re-applications and appeals are important for understanding the DI system.
Appendix B: Derivations
Marginal Treatment Effects
All derivations in this are purely for completeness -they are straightforward adaptations of that discussed in Heckman et al. (2006) or French and Taber (2011) . Define A i as a 0-1 indicator =1 if individual i is allowed benefits, y i is earnings, participation, appeals, or future allowance. We drop t subscripts for simplicity. Individual i's earnings are characterized by
where
Combining equations (10) and (11) yields:
where φ i = φ + u 1i − u i . Allowance is determined by
where 1{.} is the indicator function, Z i = (j i , X i ), and j i represents a full set of judge dummy variables. By assumption, u i and φ i are potentially correlated with each other but V i is independent of j i and X i . The Marginal Treatment Effect is
where P (Z i ) ≡ Pr(A i = 1|Z i ). Given equation (11), M T E(X i = x, V i = p) = φ + u 1i − u 0i = φ i . Using equation (12), we estimate the conditional expectation function 
Thus estimation of equation (16) and taking K ′ (p) yields the MTE. In the text we refer to for any given s and so
where the left-hand side object is E[j sγ1 − E[j sγ1 |X s ]], the de-meaned instrumental variable. We approximate the right-hand side object, but using the sample analog and leaving observation i out, as in a jackknife estimator, so the constructed instrument is: (24) where N j is the number of cases heard by judge j i over the sample period, {J} is the set of cases heard by judge j i , A s1 is the mean allowance rate by ALJs at case s's hearing office on the day case s was heard. Doyle (2008) uses a similar approach. Because we remove case i from j iγ1,−i , as in a jackknife estimator, it should be independent of η i and µ i , even in a small sample.
Based on Monte
Carlo experiments with what seemed reasonable parameters, the procedure produced accurate approximations in the linear models, as well as for the true MTE from the 10th to 90th percentiles of the distribution of the estimated judge allowance differentials, so we present estimates of the MTE over the middle 80 percent of the data.
Appendix C: Using IV estimates to identify the effect of ALJ allowance on the level of labor supply, future allowance, and appeals
Level of labor supply
The plim of the IV estimator is E[y iτ |A iti = 1] − E[y iτ |A it = 0] where y iτ is an outcome measure (participation, earnings, allowance or appeals) at time τ and A it is an indicator equal to 1 if the individual was allowed at time t.
First we describe identification of the effect of ALJ allowance on the level of labor supply. The estimation procedure described in section 4.2 identifies the change in earnings or participation caused by DI receipt. To obtain the level, note that the law of total probability 
Furthermore, equation (2) shows that
Using equations (25) and (26) over the support of our data.
Future Allowance and Appeals
Next we describe identification of time t allowance on the level of future allowance and appeals. To do this we estimate equation ( 
Appendix D: Calculation of the After-Tax Wage
We estimate after-tax wages as follows. We impute pre-tax wage income of non-working DI applicants using a predictive mean matching regression approach, described in David et al. (1986) . We first regress income y on the vector of observable variables w described in table 1, yielding y = wb + ϑ. Second, for each sample member i we calculate the predicted valueŷ i = w ib , and for each member with an observed value of y i we calculate the residual ϑ i = y i −ŷ i . Third, we sort the predicted valueŷ i into deciles. Fourth, for non-working individuals, we impute ϑ i by finding a random individual j with a value ofŷ j in the same decile asŷ i , and setting ϑ i =θ j . The imputed value of y i isŷ i +θ j . We estimate models for DI and SSI beneficiaries separately because the two groups face different labor supply incentives.
Once we impute pre-tax wage income for every member of the sample, we calculate the after-tax wage. First, we use year, state, and the Social Security earnings data to calculate the DI/SSI benefit for everyone in the sample. We impute SSI benefits using state and year for those drawing SSI benefits. Second, we predict the distribution of post-tax wages plus DI benefits (i.e., the difference between income if working and income if not working) for everyone in our data using the federal, state, and local tax schedule shown in French and Jones (2011) . Those who are allowed benefits will have DI benefits if predicted income from working is below the SGA limit ($6,000 in 1993 to $9,360 in 2002). If income is above the SGA limit, then the individual will lose benefits. If the individual is denied benefits, then there are no DI benefits to be lost when working. We assume that SSI benefits above the disregard level are reduced 50 cents for each dollar of earnings, until all SSI benefits are lost. Third, we take the sample average after-tax wage if denied and allowed, which is our measure of E[w i |A i = 0] and E[w i |A i = 1]. Our main limitation on these measurements is that ideally we should know family structure and all sources of income to calculate taxes.
Family structure is important because the DI/SSI benefit depends on marital status and the number of dependants. Unfortunately, we do not have this information, so we assume that the individual can claim no dependants for the DI/SSI benefit and is not pushed into a higher marginal tax bracket from spousal or other non-labor income.
